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The ordinary oil and gas lease in the United States calls for the
payment by the lessee of bonus money, provides for delay rentals,
and contains a provision that the lessor shall receive royalty, usually
one-eighth of the production or its equivalent in money. Generally,
most oil leases are entered into long before there is any production
and at a time when the initial down payment, or bonus money, is
slight. Similarly, the delay rentals are ordinarily small in amount
and the main consideration for the lease, insofar as the lessor is
concerned, is the possibility of royalties from production. The lessor
land-owner is naturally interested in securing development as
rapidly as possible, while the lessee may, and frequently does, desire
to delay exploration and development until a time best suited to
him. This conflict of interest has resulted in a variety of clauses in
leases involving oil and gas as well as the development of new lease
forms.
In the early days of oil production, landowners leased land for
oil and gas development for a fixed term, much as a farmer might
lease a field for the growing of crops. The lease under which the
first commercial oil well was drilled was of this type. On the expira-
tion of the fixed term the land, including the well, reverted to the
lessor. Because this was entirely unsatisfactory to the lessee, the
fixed term oil and gas lease was gradually abandoned. In some
instances the landowner conveyed an undivided interest in the oil
and gas to the "lessee" in fee with the result that the "lessee" was
under no duty to develop. Here again, dissatisfaction-this time on
the part of the landowner-resulted in the virtual abandonment of
this type of instrument. The next development was the so-called
"no-term" lease which, after construction by the courts, was found
to be unsatisfactory to both the lessor and the lessee and is not in
current use.
The two lease forms currently in use are the "or" lease, in
which the lessee is privileged to drill, i.e., develop, or to make certain
payments to the lessor; and the "unless" lease, under which the
lessee must develop within a specified time or suffer termination of
the agreement unless delay rentals are paid. The former type is
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rarely used outside the State of California with the result that today
the "unless" lease is the type most commonly used.1
The classification of leases has generally been on the basis of the
granting or habendum clause, and while "unless" provisions are
relatively standard, other provisions vary according to the desires
and ingenuity of the draftsman of the instrument.2
It is unusual for any oil and gas lease to contain any provisions
delineating the extent either of the lessee's obligation in the areas of
exploration, development, operation, marketing, and drainage pro-
tection, or of the diligence the lessee must use in fulfilling those
obligations. Indeed, where the lease is in wildcat or semi-proven
territory it would be extremely difficult to devise specific provisions
placing such obligations on the lessee. There may not be any oil and
gas under the land involved, or oil and gas may exist under only part
of it. The result has been silence in the lease agreement on these
matters, and the courts have developed the doctrine of implied cov-
enants to govern disputes between lessor and lessee in these areas.'
This is not to say that a lease cannot contain specific provisions
in these areas. Some do, particularly where the lease involves proven
territory; and where such specific provisions appear it is said that
no implied covenant can arise as to the particular obligation covered.
But even where specific provisions may exist, e.g., in development,
implied covenants may be involved in other areas, e.g., in drainage
protection or marketing. The extent and application of these im-
plied covenants require examination.
As might be expected, the obligations of the lessee vary accord-
ing to the particular implied covenant involved, as do the remedies
afforded the lessor for breach of covenant. Accordingly, the im-
plied covenants generally fall into and are classified under four
categories: (1) The implied covenant to drill an exploratory well;
(2) The implied covenant to drill additional wells; (3) The implied
covenant for diligent and proper operation of the wells, and for
marketing the products if oil or gas is discovered in paying quanti-
ties; and (4) The implied covenant to protect the leased premises
against drainage by wells on adjoining land. 4
1 Williams, Ma-xwell & Myers, Oil and Gas Cases and Materials 141 (2d ed.
1964).
2 Under usual circumstances the lease is drafted by the lessee. The lease form
is normally printed bearing a title such as "Standard Producers 88 Lease."
3 See Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases §§ 1-3 (2d ed. 1940).
4 Id. § 4. Merrill notes that, while various writers have listed the number of
categories of implied covenants from three to five, the above classification covers all
of them, the variation in number being achieved by consolidation or division of the
listed four.
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Regardless of the category, however, an implied covenant is
precisely what its name indicates. The obligation is imposed by
operation of law because of the nature and purpose of the agree-
ment and may not have been consciously considered by the parties
to the agreement.5 Thus, where the agreement contains an express
covenant relating to any of the four categories above indicated,
courts customarily state that the express covenant excludes the
possibility of any obligation arising from an implied covenant on
that particular point.6 According to Merrill, 7 a more exact statement
is that "An implication cannot stand against an express agreement.
Insofar as it is inconsistent with terms of the agreement, it must
yield." s
THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO DRILL AN EXPLORATORY WELL
Usually, the average landowner of wildcat territory is ap-
proached by a leasehound who offers him a small bonus payment,
from five to ten dollars an acre and frequently less; delay rentals
of a dollar or two per acre per year, again frequently less; and one-
eighth of the production as royalty. The landowner is invariably
presented a lease form, prepared by the lessee, which contains lan-
guage usually not fully understood by the lessor. In any event, the
lessor is almost certainly unaware that any implied covenants are
involved. He is primarily interested in royalty payments and,
therefore, in expeditious development. However, an implied cove-
nant does exist in this area under certain lease provisions. Merrill
has adopted a classification of these provisions which I shall follow
here.'
As previously indicated, leases of the fixed term or no-term
types are rarely used today, and where mineral interests are trans-
5 Id. § 7.
6 See, e.g., Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Ohio St. 324, 332, 110 N.E. 933, 935
(1915), which states that "An implied covenant can arise only when there is no expres-
sion on the subject." In Linn v. Wehrle, 35 Ohio App. 107, 111, 172 N.E. 288, 289
(1928), it is said that "there can be no implied covenant in a contract in relation to
any matter that is specifically covered by the written terms of the contract itself."
7 Op. cit. supra note 3, § 6.
8 Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 438, 89 S.E. 12, 14 (1916).
9 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, classifies the fact patterns which arise under this
covenant as follows:
A. Where the lease contains no express provisions concerning the drilling of
an exploratory well and no provisions for delay rental.
B. Where there is an express provision that the lessee is to have all of a
specified period in which to commence operations.
C. Where two separate tracts are included in a single lease, but all wells are
drilled on one tract.
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ferred in fee no duty arises for the grantee to develop in the absence
of an express covenant. While there are no Ohio cases squarely in
point there is language in parallel cases indicating the courts of this
state would hold an implied covenant exists to drill an exploratory
well where no provision for exploration appears in the lease and
where there is no provision for delay rentals. 10 Thus, in Landers v.
Ohio Oil Co.,"- the following language appears:
In an oil and gas lease which reserves to the lessor substantial
royalties in kind and in money of the oil produced and the gas
used off the premises, the promise of these royalties is the con-
trolling inducement to the securing of the lease... it necessarily
follows that the intention of the parties was that the drilling for
oil and gas should be commenced at some time, notwithstanding
that no time is mentioned in the lease .... 12
Where there is an express provision that the lessee is to have all of
a specified period in which to commence operation, if the expressions
in Kachelnacher v. Laird ' and Linn v. Wehrle'4 are to be taken at
their face value, it would logically follow that the lessee might take
all the time specified in commencing operation even though the
period may appear unreasonably long. No Ohio cases directly in
point have been found. In other jurisdictions rulings are to the effect
that, the time having been fixed by the parties, there is no implied
covenant to drill within any other time.'5 As the vast majority of
present day leases involve short primary terms and provide for
delay rentals, this problem will seldom arise.
D. Where the lease contains a provision that the lessee shall commence or
complete a well upon the leased premises, or upon other specified premises, within
a specified time, or, in lieu thereof, pay a rental for such delay.
1. Where delay rentals have been paid and accepted by the lessee.
2. Where the lessor refuses to accept payment of delay rentals and demands
that the lessee commence operations.
3. Where operations have been carried on upon other lands, as provided for in
the lease.
Id. § 14, at 51. (Text italicized in the original.)
20 The great weight of authority is to this effect. Cases so holding are listed in
Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 15, at 52.
11 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 65 (C.P. 1921).
12 Id. at 70.
13 92 Ohio St. 324, 110 N.E. 933 (1915).
14 35 Ohio App. 107, 172 N.E. 288 (1928).
15 See, e.g., Adkins v. Adams, 152 F2d 489 (7th Cir. 1945) (solid minerals and
oil production apparently regarded as incidental); Skinner v. Ajax Portland Cement
Co., 109 Kan. 72, 197 Pac. 875 (1921) (lease for ninety-nine years, express provision
that drilling to be optional within that period); McKee v. Thornton, 79 Okla. 138,
192 Pac. 212 (1920) (provision that oil and gas to be prospected for within twenty
years). See generally Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 18.
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The problem which arises where two separate tracts are in-
cluded in a single lease, but all wells are drilled on one tract was
first presented in Alford v. Dennis,6 in which two tracts of land
about two miles apart were covered by the same lease. Producing
wells were drilled on one tract but none were drilled on the other.
The non-producing tract subsequently passed to one of the heirs
of the original lessor and suit was brought to cancel the lease as to
that particular tract on the basis that the implied covenant to ex-
plore had been breached. Cancellation was decreed, the court stating
that "since plaintiff's land was burdened with an oil and gas lease
he is entitled to have those lands prospected for oil and gas within
a reasonable time." 17
In Ohio as early as 1903, Northwestern Ohio National Gas Co.
v. Ullery"' held that, where the lessee agrees that the contract or
lease should extend to heirs and assignees and the tracts pass to
separate owners, the payment for gas production should go to the
owner of the tract on which the producing well was located. In this
instance the two tracts joined at one comer and the ruling would
appear to follow the general rule laid down in Alford v. Dennis."
Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co v. Ullery did, however, contain
the statement. "It may be that the payment of the rental of $150
for this one well would have the effect to hold the lease on both
tracts as between the original parties .. ,, 20 This indicates a possi-
ble departure from the rule of Alford v. Dennis where the non-
productive tract had not been transferred. It is difficult to believe
the possibility mentioned by the court in Ullery would be applied
to transfers in view of prior language of the Ohio circuit courts in
such cases as Baumgardner v. Browning,2 where it was stated:
[W]e have held heretofore, that where wells have been sunk
under a contract of lease, and found to be productive wells, that
it was the duty of the lessee to proceed diligently and make a fair
use of the premises in producing the oil, to the end that the lessor
might have his royalty and the use of his premises .... 22
16 102 Kan. 403, 170 Pac. 1005 (1918).
17 Id. at 406, 170 Pac. at 1007.
18 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N.E. 494 (1903).
19 Compare Ohio Gas Co. v. Davis, 6 Ohio C.C. Dec. 529, aff'd, 59 Ohio St.
591, 54 N.E. 1106 (1898), an even stronger case as a single tract had been subdivided.
See generally Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 19.
20 68 Ohio St. at 273, 67 N.E. at 496. (Emphasis added.)
21 5 Ohio C.C. Dec. 394 (1896).
22 Id. at 396. Cf. Kenton Gas & Elec. Co. v. Orwich, 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 786
(1900). "If the first well proved a good one . . . there was an implied contract to
make a second well and a sufficient number of wells to reasonably develop the whole
land... "' Id. at 788.
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The action of the Ohio Supreme Court in Coffinberry v. Sun Oil
Co.,)2 3 permitting cancellation as to those portions of a leased tract
which the lessee had failed to protect against drainage increases
this doubt. Of course, the latter case was based on another implied
covenant-that of protection against drainage-but it would seem
from the reasoning used that the same principle would apply.
Despite the dictum in Ullery, then, it is believed the rule of Alford
v. Dennis would be applied in Ohio for it seems to be the better rule.
Where the lease contains a standard delay rental clause, that is,
provides for payment in the event of the lessor's delay in explora-
tion, Merrill recognizes three classes of cases: (1) where the delay
rentals have been paid by the lessee and accepted by the lessor;
(2) where the lessor refuses payment and demands exploration;
and (3) where operations have been carried on upon other lands
as provided in the lease.24
The early Ohio case of Venedocia Oil & Gas Co. v. Robinson2 5
was one in which delay rentals had been paid. The lease contained
a clause reading: "In case no well is completed within ninety days
from date hereof, unavoidable delay excepted, then this grant shall
become null and void, unless second party shall pay the first parties
[delay rentals]...." 2. Despite the use of the term "grant" instead
of "lease" the court recognized the instrument to be a lease, and
stated that "the lessor, by acceptance of the stipulated rental, has
waived performance of the implied engagement to develop the prem-
ises, to the end of the last year for which rent was paid." 27 The
case syllabus does not mention waiver but says that the time within
which the implied engagement must be performed is postponed by
acceptance of the sum specified. The difference in language appears
to be immaterial.28 It thus appears that in this situation Ohio follows
the position taken by a majority of jurisdictions.29
Where the lessor refuses to accept payment of delay rentals
and demands that the lessee commence operations, difficult questions
are raised. It has already been shown that where the lease is silent
as to the time of the commencement of a well and does not provide
for delay rentals, an implied covenant arises requiring the lessee
23 68 Ohio St. 488, 67 N.E. 1069 (1903).
24 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 9.
25 71 Ohio St. 302, 73 N.E. 222 (1905).
26 Ibid. This clause is strikingly similar to the modern "unless" clause.
27 Id. at 315, 73 N.E. at 224.
28 A similar ruling was made in Kachelmacher v. Laird, supra note 6, the court
stating that payment of the rental in accordance with the terms of the lease keeps
the lease in force during the period for which the rent was paid.
29 Cases are collected in Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 23, and 2 Summers, Oil
and Gas § 397 n.57 (perm. ed. 1959).
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to commence a well within a reasonable time. Where the lease is
an "or" or "unless" type, however, the lease will contain an express
agreement that the lessee may, by payment of rental, defer drilling.
It has been suggested that delay rentals are liquidated dam-
ages for delay in the performance of the contract, not an alternative
obligation representing fulfillment of the contract,30 but this position
has not been taken by Ohio courts. Some jurisdictions have held
that, if the parties have stipulated that rentals would be payable in
lieu of development, then an express provision, as opposed to any
implied covenant to develop, would exist.31 This would, of course, be
consistent with the general rule.32 It should be obvious, however,
that such a position might work serious hardship if the leased
premises were in proven territory 33 or, as is more likely, territory
which became proven after execution of the lease. Further, this
application of the general rule might, in the absence of other im-
plied covenants, permit a lessee who had wells on adjoining lands
to drain the leased premises.34
Because of the possibility of drainage, the underlying proposi-
tion that the main consideration for a lease is royalty, and the
additional implied covenant to prevent drainage, some courts,
notably those of Indiana 35 and Kentucky,36 have held that it would
be unfair to the lessor to permit the lessee to delay drilling for
extended periods and thereby deprive the lessor of royalties, stating
that the lessor might refuse to accept delay rentals and demand
development within a reasonable time thereafter. These decisions
may have been influenced by the fact that in each case the bonus
and rental payments were nominal. Summers expresses the view
that such decisions are "violative of all settled rules of interpreta-
tion and construction of contracts .... 37
30 Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
31 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 27.
32 See supra note 6 and associated text material.
33 Proven territory is used to mean land under which, from surrounding produc-
ing wells, oil or gas or both is known to exist.
34 Meyers & Williams, "Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Drainage
Caused by the Lessee," 40 Texas L. Rev. 923 (1962); cf. Comment, 35 Miss. L.J.
280 (1964).
35 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Littler, 162 Ind. 320, 70 N.E. 363 (1904).
36 Monarch Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v. Richardson, 124 Ky. 602, 99 S.W. 668 (1907).
The position established by this case was specifically repudiated by statute where the
oil and gas lease contained a delay rental clause. Ky. Stat. 376 6b-4a (Carroll 1936)
[apparently still the law by virtue of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 446.130, .170 (1963)].
See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 353.020-.060 (1963). The pros and cons of the rule are
discussed in Veasey, "The Law of Oil and Gas," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 652 (1920).
37 2 Summers, op. cit. supra note 25, § 397, at 547. Quaere as to contracts of
adhesion.
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The Ohio Supreme Court seems to have vacillated between the
two positions. In Central Ohio Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. Eckert,38
the court declined to permit the lessor to enjoin operations by the
lessee on leased premises following the lessor's refusal to accept
delay rentals and his notice to the lessee that the lease was termi-
nated. Although the court said the option was to terminate the leases
or keep them in force by payment of delay rentals, no mention
was made of implied covenants and the decision may have been
based on the ground that-assuming an implied covenant to exist-
the lessee should have reasonable time to commence operations
after refusal to accept delay rentals.
Shortly thereafter, in Venedocia Oil & Gas Co. v. Robinson30
the court indicated approval of the Indiana position, discussed Con-
sumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Littler"4 at some length, and, by dictum
at least, recognized the existence of an implied covenant to drill
within a reasonable time after lessor's refusal to accept delay rentals
even though such delay rentals were provided for in the lease. Ten
years later, in the Kachelmacher case, the court said:
The rights of the parties must be determined from their own
contract. Under the clearly expressed terms of the lease, if the
lessee does not drill he may still continue the lease in force by pay-
ment of the stipulated rental. Such matter being covered by the
express terms of the written contract, no implication can arise
in relation thereto inconsistent with, or in opposition to, such
plain provision of the written contract. An implied covenant can
arise only when there is no expression on the subject.41
In Kachelmacher the plaintiff complained of failure to drill
during a period for which delay rentals had been paid and ac-
cepted and the quoted language is, therefore, dictum, but it strongly
indicates a denial of any implied covenant and a rejection of the
Indiana position. This appears to be the latest expression by the
Ohio Supreme Court and the result is a conflict of dicta.
The only case in which a lower court has discussed the precise
point involved is Landers v. Ohio Oil Co.4 2 The court, after a review
of the cases already noted, distinguished Kachelmnacher on its facts. 43
38 70 Ohio St. 127, 71 N.E. 281 (1904).
30 Supra note 25.
40 Supra note 35.
41 Supra note 6, at 332, 110 N.E. at 935.
42 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 65 (C.P. 1921).
43 The court observed:
In the Kacheblnacher case, the customary delay rental in that vicinity was
from 25 cents to $1.00 per acre, but there the lease provided for the payment
of about 60 times the customary rental. The territory leased was 8 tenths of
1965]
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Merrill suggests Ohio would follow the rule denying an implied
covenant in delay rental leases, but he makes no mention of the
Landers case.44 Although the present situation is unsettled, the
Landers case, as the latest judicial expression, would appear to indi-
cate that Ohio courts will infer a covenant when the principal in-
ducement for the lease is royalty and will deny it when such is
not the case.
Cases in which the operations have been carried on upon other
lands, as provided for in the lease, are infrequent because this form
of agreement is relatively rare and, where used at all, applies to
wildcat or unproven territory. It is usually in the "unless" or "or"
lease form and the stipulation for drilling states that a well must
be commenced or completed on the premises or in the vicinity
within a specified time, followed by the "unless" or "or" provision.
Only two Ohio cases construing such leases appear to exist and
both merely construe the meaning of vicinity; 45 the existence of an
implied covenant was not in issue in either case. Determination
of the existence or nonexistence of an implied covenant in such
cases should follow the same rules and reasons as indicated in the
preceding paragraph.
THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO DRILL ADDITIONAL WELLS
If the lease contains no delay rental clause it terminates by its
own terms unless production is secured during the named period of
the lease. The great weight of authority holds that the lessee, follow-
ing the drilling of a nonproductive exploratory well, may not con-
tinue to hold the leased premises during the fixed term without
making further efforts to secure production.46 Ohio apparently
follows the majority rule, but does not require the lessee to redrill
an acre. Not more than 5 per cent of the oil or gas produced from the well on
this lot would come from the land of the lessor. This extraordinary high
delay rental, the Supreme Court holds was agreed to by the parties in lieu
of an express covenant to drill. From these facts it must be assumed that in
that case the primary purpose of the giving of the lease was not necessarily
the drilling of a well, like the case at bar and the other cases referred to.
For these reasons, to-wit: That the facts are so materially different from the
case at bar and the other cases referred to, and the resultant difference in the
purpose of the giving of the lease, the court was obliged to hold as it did
in that case.
rd. at 77.
44 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 32, at 99-100.
45 West v. Hall, 23 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 575 (Cir. Ct. 1912) (this land, adjacent
or adjoining land); Iit re Oil Well Lease, 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 860 (1896) (vicinity).
46 See cases collected in Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 14, at 53 n.7.
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at once, i.e., the lessee is permitted a reasonable time to determine
whether further operations will be conducted. What a reasonable
time is must be determined from the facts of the particular situa-
tion, and whether or not the premises leased are in proven or
unproven territory should be a material factor. In Baumgardner v.
Browning47 the territory was unproven, and it was held that a six-
year delay after the drilling of the initial nonproductive well was
not sufficiently long to call for cancellation of the lease or to be
considered a breach of the implied covenant. Because modern leases
of unproven territory usually contain delay rental provisions this
particular problem should seldom arise.
It has already been noted that Ohio appears to follow the
position that an implied covenant to explore exists despite the ex-
press covenant concerning delay rentals. Such being the case it
would logically follow that where the lease provides for the payment
of delay rentals the drilling of a dry hole would not destroy the
implied covenant. Such drilling would, in view of the holding in
Landers v. Ohio Oil Co.,4 constitute a fact to be considered to
determine whether delay in drilling constituted a breach of the
covenant. Thus, in the Baumgardner case a six-year delay in un-
proven territory was held not too long a time. This lease was, of
course, a fixed-term lease and the conclusion follows only by
analogy.49
Where the lease provides that the drilling of a nonproductive
exploratory well terminates the lessee's obligation to pay delay
rentals the nonproductive exploratory well merely converts the
delay rental lease into a fixed-term lease and the rule of the Baum-
gardner case would seemingly apply. Although it involves prior
productive wells and subsequent further development, one Ohio
case states that the lessee is entitled to notice that the lessor will
insist on further development and to a reasonable time thereafter
in which to perform 0 It appears probable that the same rule would
apply in the situation under discussion.
The implied covenant to drill additional wells may appear
where the exploratory well produces oil or gas in paying quantities,
as well as in the situations discussed above, where the exploratory
47 Supra note 21.
48 Supra note 42.
49 Abandonment of the lease may also result from a dry hole if there is no further
development. See e.g., Tucker v. Watts, 15 Ohio C.C. Dec. 320, aff'd, 72 Ohio St. 632,
76 N.E. 1134 (1905). Abandonment is quite different from a breach of an implied
covenant and involves the conscious intent of the lessee, as indicated by the circum-
stances, to discontinue all operations.
GO Ohio Oil Co. v. Hurlbert, 7 Ohio C.C. Dec. 321 (1897), aff'd, 60 Ohio St. 613,
54 N.E. 1103 (1899).
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well proved nonproductive. In 1897, the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 1 said:
There is no express covenant, condition, or agreement in the
lease as to the extent to which the lands should be developed, nor
as to the number of wells that should be drilled after completion of
the first well. Is there an implied covenant, condition, or agree-
ment, as to such development, or as to the drilling of a reasonable
number of wells?
On principle, it would seem that there is such a covenant ...
We therefore hold, both on principle and authority, that there
is an implied covenant in this lease to reasonably develop the lands
by drilling and operating such number of wells as would be ordi-
narily required for the production of the oil contained in such
lands, and afford ordinary protection in the lines.52
This case, in using the "reasonable development" test at least
implied that no distinction would be made among any of the follow-
ing situations: (1) no provision in the lease as to drilling of wells
during a fixed term; (2) provision in the lease for drilling of one
or more wells during a fixed term; and (3) drilling of wells after
expiration of the fixed term.5 3 The Harris case involved drilling
after the expiration of the fixed term and included an element of
drainage." Although an express covenant to drill one or two wells
during the primary term exists, the Harris case suggests that such
a covenant might not prevent an implied covenant to drill addi-
tional wells. It has already been shown that an express covenant
concerning delay rentals may not prevent an implied covenant as
to exploration, a somewhat analogous situation. Ohio Oil Co. v.
Hurlbert55 stated that the lessee was entitled to notice from the
lessor that further development was demanded and to a reasonable
time thereafter to comply with that demand. This would indicate
the existence of an implied covenant. The position following implied
covenants is the better rule and should be applied by the courts
of Ohio. Surely the desire of the lessor to have one or two explora-
tory wells drilled should not operate to preclude full development
of the land, especially where the primary inducement for the lease
is the prospect of royalty.
51 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
52 Id. at 126-27, 48 N.E. at 505. (Emphasis added.)
53 The classification follows Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 49, at 129-30.
54 See Weisant v. Follett, 17 Ohio App. 371 (1922). Linn v. Wehrle, 35 Ohio
App. 107, 172 N.E. 288 (1928), impliedly recognizes the obligation to develop, but
only by dictum, since the lease expressly denied the existence of the implied covenant.
55 Supra note 50.
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No Ohio cases have been found involving the fact situation
where wells after producing oil and gas in paying quantities cease
production during the primary term. In the event that production
is not again secured by the end of the primary term the usual lease
would terminate by its own terms unless drilling operations were
going on at that time. 6 Where cessation of production occurs
after the primary term has expired, the lessee is entitled to a reason-
able time in which to drill other wells and seek new production,
57
even though the lease has expired and no implied covenant placing
any obligation on the lessee then exists. 5
As far as Ohio is concerned, it is probable that the implied
covenant for development includes the obligation to explore other
strata. If exploraton of this nature is carried on by a reasonably
prudent operator, the quoted language of the Harris case should
apply. No Ohio cases directly in point have been found; however, in
other jurisdictions there is substantial precedent holding the implied
covenant to exist.59
THE IMPLIED COVENANT FOR PROPER OPERATiON AND MARKETING
Under normal circumstances a lessee who has expended large
sums of money in geophysical studies, in drilling, and in equipping
a producing well is going to use every effort to make a profit, and
no question will arise as to this implied covenant. Special circum-
stances may make it beneficial to a lessee from a profit standpoint
to fail to market the petroleum products, and in these circumstances
the courts have generally said an implied covenant exists.6
In Ohio the early case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Lane"' denied the
existence of any implied covenant to market gas under a lease
which required a payment of 300 dollars per year per well where
the gas was used off the premises. There are indications in the
decisions that the court was of the opinion that the provision was
an incidental addition to the lease to cover a product of little value
and that the primary interest was in oil. No subsequent rulings on
the particular point appear to have been made by the supreme
court. One lower court, however, completely disregarded the Lane
decision and by dictum recognized the existence of an implied
5 This assumes the lease contains the usual specific clause to that effect.
57 Blair v. Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co., 5 Ohio C.C. Dec. 619 (1896).
58 The usual lease stipulates that it shall continue in force as long after the
primary term as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities.
59 The cases are collected in Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 69, at 175 n.22.
G0 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 72; 2 Summers, op. cit. supra note 25, § 400.
61 59 Ohio St. 307, 52 N.E. 791 (1898).
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covenant "to operate the premises with due diligence." 62 This
language would seem to include marketing production as well as
operations on the leasehold. Such judicial expression appears in
Litton v. Geisler.63 That case involved a lease calling for a payment
of 300 dollars per well while gas was marketed, a provision very
similar to that in the Lane case. The court was primarily concerned
with the question of when a well is considered to be producing in
paying quantities, and laid great stress on the good faith of the
operators. No mention was made of the Lane case or of any implied
covenant to operate, but the opinion's language indicates that the
court would require the lessee to operate the premises in good faith,
which seemingly would include a good-faith effort to market.
THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO PROTECT AGAINST DRAINAGE
A landowner may be deprived of oil and gas underlying his
property by drainage to adjoining lands. This loss may permanently
deprive the landowner of substantial royalty. Since the lessor by
leasing has deprived himself of the right to take protective action
by drilling off-set wells himself, such action must be taken by the
lessee. Thus, in the absence of any express covenant on the subject,
there is an implied covenant requiring the lessee to protect the
premises leased against drainage.64 Ohio follows the general rule.65
However, complicated problems arise when the lease contains
a delay rental clause, or a clause calling for the drilling of a specific
number of wells. The early Ohio case of Harris v. Ohio Oil Co.6 in
dictum indicated that a lease specifying the number of wells to be
drilled would preclude application of an implied covenant involving
the drilling of any additional wells.6 7 There is ample authority in
other jurisdictions to support the opposite view-which many be-
lieve is the better view-that the lessee by stipulating a minimum
number of wells to be drilled does not thereby consent or intend
to consent to having his royalty reduced by drainage, 6 and, there-
62 Tedrow v. Shaffer, 23 Ohio App. 343, 346, 155 N.E. 510, 511 (1926).
63 80 Ohio App. 491, 76 N.E.2d 741 (1945).
64 See, e.g., Lin v. Wehrle, supra note 54, where the lease contained an express
covenant negating the existence of any implied covenant to protect lines. See also
Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 94, at 236, which states that "the decisions, practically
without exception, recognize its existence."
65 Coffinberry v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 23; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra
note 51.
66 Supra note 51.
67 Supra note 51, at 128, 48 N.E. at 505.
68 Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 100-01.
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fore, the implied covenant to prevent drainage, i.e., to protect lines,
is not eliminated by a clause setting the minimum number of wells
to be drilled.
Delay rental clauses present a different problem. As previously
indicated, acceptance of delay rentals is held to constitute a waiver
of the implied covenant to drill an exploratory well, at least for the
period for which the rental is paid. If the lessor desires to compel
drilling he must refuse the payment and demand performance.
There appears to be no reason to make a distinction where the initial
well also protects against drainage. No Ohio cases specifically in
point have been found, although the Kachkelmacher case6 9 has been
construed both to support and to deny the existence of the implied
covenant where delay rentals are accepted.70 The turning point of
the disagreement is whether acceptance of rentals waives drilling
requirements for the rental period or merely waives exploratory
drilling. Certainly, where the fact of drainage is known at the
time of acceptance the better rule would seem to be in favor of
waiver of exploratory drilling only. The difficulty here is to prove
knowledge of drainage. Even if there is a producing well adjacent
to the property in question there can be no actual assurance that
oil is present until drilling occurs. Where the primary term has
expired but the lease is to continue until production ceases, the
courts of Ohio recognize the existence of an implied covenant to
protect against drainage. 71
No distinction has been made in Ohio between situations in-
volving drainage of the leased premises by the lessee as the operator
of adjoining leases and drainage by others. There has been dispute
as to whether the lessee is under any greater duty to protect lines
where he himself owns the adjoining leases. Authorities in the field
would impose no greater duty,72 but some courts have indicated a
greater duty exists. 73 The Ohio courts have apparently ignored the
problem.7 4
69 92 Ohio St. 324, 110 N.E. 933 (1915).
70 Compare Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, § 106, with Brown, "Covenants Implied
in Oil and Gas Leases," 1960 A.B.A. Section of Mineral & Natural Resources Law
Proceedings 162, 163 & n.47.
71 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 51.
72 See Seed, "The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to Refrain from
Depletory Acts," 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 508, 512-13 (1956). (This author disagrees with
the authority, however.)
73 See generally Meyers & Williams, "Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases:
Drainage Caused by the Lessee," 40 Texas L. Rev. 923 (1962) ; Comment, 35 Miss.
LJ. 324 (1964); Comment, 35 Miss. L.J. 280 (1964).
74 See, e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 51, where the defendant was the
lessee by assignment of the Harris tract as well as of the adjoining tracts.
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REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF IMPLIED COVENANTS
The general rule which is followed in Ohio is that the lessor
cannot utilize self-help to protect his interests where implied cove-
nants have been breached by the lessee. In Harris v. Ohio Oil Co.,"
for example, the lessee was denied the right to self-help (declaration
of a forfeiture) and damages were held to be the proper remedy.
It may be extremely difficult to prove damages where the breach
consists of failure to drill an exploratory well and the premises are
in wild-cat territory or in what would be considered step-out terri-
tory. Similarly, damages might be difficult to prove in drainage
cases7 6 and one Ohio case noted that no adequate remedy at law
existed because of the difficulty of showing the amount of damages."r
Forfeitures usually are looked upon with disfavor, and Ohio
early took the position that a general forfeiture clause, such as one
providing for termination of the lease upon failure to pay delay
rentals, would preclude forfeiture for any other reason .7 This posi-
tion might be satisfactory where appropriate damages can be shown,
as in case of failure to market, or failure to develop a known pro-
ductive area. Forfeiture might well be appropriate in case of failure
to drill an exploratory well where the lease will permit the existence
of an implied covenant to do so, or where the lessee has breached
the implied covenant against protection of lines. This position is
limited to situations where forfeiture could be adjudged as to un-
drilled portions of the lease and then only after proper demand on
the part of the lessor. This was the position taken by Cofllnberry v.
Sun Oil Co."9 Thus far the courts of Ohio have declined to order
the lessee to drill and develop or forfeit.80
Certainly, where the lessee has the option during the primary
term of drilling or paying delay rentals, there can be no action at
all for failure to drill unless for breach of some other covenant, such
as the covenant to protect lines, and this covenant appears to be
the only one that could be breached in the absence of initial drilling.
Granted that there can be no absolute certainty that there is oil
or gas under the particular leased property until a well is drilled,
the advance in geophysical knowledge permits a much better de-
termination of probabilities than in years past. If in a particular
75 Supra note 51.
76 See generally Merrill, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 148-58; 3 Summers, Oil and
Gas §§ 433-36 (perm. ed. 1958).
77 Coffinberry v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 23.
78 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 51.
79 Supra note 23.
80 See Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Ohio St. 324, 110 N.E. 933 (1915).
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situation a prudent operator would protect lines even though a
delay rental clause appears in the lease, then the better practice
would call for such protection or for forfeiture of the lease.
CONCLUSION
Ohio appears generally to follow the majority rules. As can be
seen, however, the Ohio cases on implied covenants are few, fre-
quently conflicting, and leave much to be desired in clarity. Most
of the precedent is from an era of ignorance of geological techniques
and reservoir mechanics. One hopes future decisions will be based
on the modern technological information then available and on
modern precedent then existing in other jurisdictions. The proper
development of the petroleum resources of Ohio should recognize
the basic proposition that the lessor expects to be compensated
through royalty, i.e., drilling and development coupled with proper
protection of the petroleum substances under his land. It should
likewise be recognized that the lessee is entitled to exercise the
rights secured under the lease as a reasonably prudent operator
would exercise them. He should be held to no higher standard.
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